Musings on Economic Freedom from the Texas Public Policy Foundation’s
In his seminal work, The Antitrust Paradox (1978), Robert Bork wrote that many of the doctrines driving antitrust enforcement are “ultimately incompatible with the preservation of a liberal capitalist social order.”
This has essentially been the case since the states and the U.S. Congress began adopting antitrust laws in the last few years of the 19th century. Standard Oil, for instance, was found to have violated antitrust laws even as it used technology and innovations in distribution to drive steep declines in energy prices that made the benefits of increased energy use available to all Americans, rather than only the wealthy and elite.
In recent years, the dramatic rise in antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general has raised questions about how the involvement of states might exacerbate the harm often caused to competition and innovation through antitrust enforcement.
To answer these questions, the Texas Public Policy Foundation today released a new study, Protecting Innovation: The Role of State Attorneys General in Antitrust Enforcement by Josiah Neeley and me.
We viewed the involvement of the states through three lenses: federalism, competition, and efficient enforcement. We found 1) the participation of states in antitrust enforcement in national and international markets is generally not a good fit for our system of federalism, 2) modern insight into how free markets work has not found its way completely into law through revisions of antitrust laws and judicial doctrines—particularly at the state level, thus serving as a hindrance to competition and innovation, and 3) the duplicative nature of interstate antitrust investigations by state attorneys general and the multiple jeopardy of companies defending against so many different enforcers are not efficient means of addressing antitrust concerns.
The challenges of increased state involvement are particularly acute in high-technology markets, where antitrust enforcement is already problematic in several ways. Consumers benefit from increased efficiency, but efficiency can increase market share, which in turn can trigger ill-advised antitrust enforcement. The complexity and rapid innovation of high-tech markets increase the danger of erroneous and damaging antitrust enforcement. These challenges are exacerbated by state involvement in antitrust.
While we see a clear role for the states in enforcing antitrust law in local commerce, it is much more difficult to discern a role for the states in transactions that are in many cases not only national, but international. Instead, the involvement of the states in these markets is more likely to lead to an expansive regulatory regime that inhibits—rather than enhances—competition and innovation. This is particularly true in the case of e-commerce.
We argue that the scope of state antitrust enforcement should be reduced, particularly with respect to interstate and high technology markets. Specifically, we recommend that states’ ability to bring parens patriae suits under the federal antitrust laws should be repealed, and that state involvement in premerger review should be curtailed. We also find that where the federal government has settled an antitrust matter under investigation, continued state involvement makes little sense, and in fact may stifle product development, investment and innovation.
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Bill Peacock
Vice President of Research
Director, Center for Economic Freedom
Texas Public Policy Foundation
o: (512) 472-2700
c: (512) 965-6476

